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Abstract: 
 
Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling (MCOOL) was implemented on seafood in the United 
States on April 4, 2005. MCOOL exempts the foodservice sector and excludes processed 
seafood from labeling. This paper contributes to understanding the economics of the MCOOL 
law for seafood by showing that current partial implementation may have unintended 
consequences on the domestic supply chain. While labeling satisfies the market demand for 
information provision in one market, exemptions in the other market may create incentives for 
the diversion of imports, which are assumed to be lower in quality than domestic seafood, to the 
non-labeled sector. Analyzing alternate scenarios such as voluntary labeling shows that total 
welfare may be greatest under this scenario compared with partial MCOOL. Voluntary origin 
labeling of seafood by some U.S. retailers indicates there is no compelling market failure 
argument warranting partial MCOOL implementation. This work is therefore a step towards 
analyzing the effect of partial MCOOL policy in the seafood industry taking into consideration 
the nature of the industry. 
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Partial Implementation of COOL: Economic Effects in the U.S. Seafood Industry 
Introduction 
The recent spate of incidents with U.S. imports has turned the heat back on the 
issue of mandatory country-of-origin labeling (MCOOL). Prominent incidents are recalls 
of a number of Chinese-made products: farm-raised shrimp and catfish, pet food laced 
with contaminated wheat gluten, toothpaste containing diethylene glycol—a poison used 
in antifreeze, children's necklaces and earrings, toy trains and popular preschool toys 
containing high levels of lead. Barboza (2007) outlines the degraded conditions in which 
some seafood for export to United States is farmed in China. The media also reports that 
at-risk Chinese seafood shipments that are supposed to be tested for safety are going 
unchecked and that FDA personnel “inspect less than 1 percent of all imported food and 
conduct laboratory analysis on only a tiny fraction of those (LA Times, 2007; 
www.foodandwaterwatch.org).”   
At the same time, a food labeling poll conducted by Consumer Reports shows that 
consumers want to know where their food comes from and expect higher label standards. 
According to the poll, 92 percent of consumers agree that imported foods should be 
labeled by their country of origin.  
The U.S. Congress implemented MCOOL in the United States in April 2005 for 
fish and shellfish. The objective was to communicate to consumers the national origin 
and method of production (wild or farm-raised) via mandatory labels. However, the 
labels are restricted to fresh and frozen seafood at the retail level. Foodservice 
establishments, small retailers and ingredients in processed seafood products are exempt. 
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On one hand, the resulting partial coverage creates a potentially gaping hole possibly 
undermining the effectiveness of MCOOL law. On the other hand, is there a market 
failure that warrants the implementation of this law? This paper tackles these issues. 
The increase in demand for fish and seafood, the growth of cheaper imports of 
seafood and particularly the increase in consumption away-from-home, and the partial 
implementation of MCOOL imply that a large part of the market is not covered by the 
law. According to Hale (2005), restaurants are the key source of seafood, with 60 percent 
of consumers reporting they eat more seafood away from home. More specifically 
Keithly (1985) estimates that the quantity of away-from-home seafood products 
consumed ranges from one-third to two-thirds of all consumption of seafood. The overall 
exempt market (retailers not subject to the rule and foodservice establishments) accounts 
for 62 percent of fish and 75 percent of shellfish (USDA-AMS, 2004). Stewart et al. 
(2004) predict that per capita spending on seafood could rise by 18 percent at full-service 
restaurants and by 6 percent for fast food between 2000 and 2020. 
Currently, over 70 percent of the seafood Americans consume is imported 
(National Marine Fisheries Service, 2007). The significant share of imports in U.S. 
seafood consumption raises concern about their safety. In the United States, the use of the 
Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP) system is considered necessary to 
ensure quality and safety of seafood. While imports are required to have the same 
standards of quality and safety, enforcement may be weaker. HACCP operates in the 
context of an extensive set of requirements for good manufacturing practices and sanitary 
operating procedures. In addition, there are numerous federal and state regulations that 
influence the location and timing of harvest and the choices of aquaculture operations 
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(Caswell, 2006). Products from less developed countries are generally perceived to be of 
lower quality than products of developed countries (Verlegh and Steenkamp, 1999). 
According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, 80 percent of the total imported edible 
seafood in 2007 came from less developed countries. Although there is no evidence that 
imported seafood is necessarily riskier, a number of countries exporting seafood to the 
United States have poorer internal control systems and/or are in tropical areas where 
toxin and bacteria hazards are higher. Imports become an issue of concern because 
countries vary in their use of vaccines, feed additives, and antibiotics for farm-raised fish 
and shellfish (Allshouse et al., 2004).  
The objective of this paper is to examine the welfare effects for consumers and 
sellers with MCOOL implementation for seafood, given that more than 70 percent of 
seafood consumed in the United States is imported and most of it (by value) is consumed 
in the foodservice sector. MCOOL is a retail labeling program and does not cover the 
foodservice sector. As noted above, exemptions and exclusions of MCOOL on covered 
seafood products amount to 62 percent fish and 75 percent of shellfish. This effectively 
means that most of the imported seafood consumed in United States is not affected by the 
MCOOL legislation. The presence of a non-labeled sector raises the possibility of 
diversion of lower quality seafood into this sector, which might undermine the 
effectiveness of the law. This paper does not consider white table cloth restaurants where 
quality and safety of seafood may not be an issue. 
To address the economic impact of the MCOOL law in the foodservice and retail 
sector, this paper develops a conceptual model that explores diversion of imported 
seafood to the non-labeled sector. The model is a variant of the model of vertical product 
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differentiation by Mussa and Rosen (1978) and explicitly accounts for differences in 
consumer attitudes towards foreign and domestic seafood, which are facilitated by origin 
labeling. Consumers are postulated to differ in the utility they derive from the 
consumption of domestic and foreign seafood. We assume that consumers consider 
foreign fish to be of lower quality compared to domestic fish. This assumption that 
consumers perceive domestic fish to be of higher quality than imported fish is reinforced 
by a) recent safety incidents with imported products, b) media reports on fish farming 
practices in developing countries and the ineffective inspection of imports, and c) 
presentations in popular magazine and newspaper articles of the healthy seafood guide, 
which informs consumers to avoid most imported fish (www.edf.org/seafood).1  
Wimberley et al. (2003) found that 80 percent of U.S. consumers believe that food 
produced or raised in the United States is fresher and safer than imported food. 
MCOOL law is a retail labeling program, which brings us to the question of 
mandatory labeling in the foodservice sector. The absence of labeling (mandatory or 
voluntary) may result in an information problem between consumers and sellers. More 
specifically, in the foodservice market, consumers are not informed of the origin of 
seafood that sellers know about.2 This information deficit may lead consumers to make 
choices they would not have made with full information. We assume as in Lusk et al. 
(2006), that country of origin is often associated with product quality. Like nutritional 
                                                 
1 However, it is not always the case that imported seafood is of lower perceived quality than domestic 
seafood. For example, Mexican shrimp is considered to have superior flavor and texture over domestic or 
other imported shrimp (Cavanaugh, 2003). 
 
2 It is reasonable to expect sellers (in this case foodservice operators) are aware of the origin of fish and 
shellfish. They are better informed about the ingredients used in prepared meals, proportions in which they 
are mixed, and the cooking methods used. 
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attributes, quality is a credence attribute that implies consumers cannot learn about the 
characteristics of a product readily through inspection or even after consumption (Nelson 
1970; Darby and Karni 1973). However, a credence attribute can be transformed into a 
search attribute. With COOL, quality becomes a search attribute because the label 
provides information about seafood products that may affect the consumers’ perception 
and evaluation of its quality.  
In markets where sellers are better informed about product quality (or origin in 
our case) than consumers, and when consumers may have perceptions of the risk and 
hazards of consuming products from certain countries, the key factor in determining 
whether markets for higher quality attributes operate effectively is the success of quality 
signaling (e.g., labeling, advertising, warranties) by sellers to consumers (Caswell and 
Mojduszka, 1996). Several theoretical and empirical studies on quality-signaling models 
explore how communication (voluntary and mandatory) between sellers and consumers 
takes place.3 For example, Akerlof’s (1970) “lemons” model provides the classic 
argument for how asymmetric information may hinder markets. In this model, quality 
cannot be signaled. As a result a market may not exist or only the lowest-quality product 
may be sold.  
On the other hand, voluntary communication addressed by Grossman’s (1981) 
“unfolding model” predicts a market exists for varying levels of quality when quality 
signaling is totally effective, costless, and truthful, and consumers can costlessly verify 
                                                 
3 A literature on informational unraveling suggests that voluntary and mandatory disclosure yield the same 
outcome, as long as the information is verifiable with zero cost, as first studied by Grossman (1981) and 
Milgrom (1981). Voluntary disclosure leads to only partial unraveling of information is shown by 
Jovanovic (1982), Farrell (1986), Fishman and Hagerty (2003), and Jin (2003). Jin (2003) and Mathios 
(2000) show empirical investigations of informational unraveling. 
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quality after their purchases. Spence’s (1977) “signaling theory” argues that some sellers 
may voluntarily try to reduce asymmetric information by sending signals to consumers. 
Warranties are often considered a common type of signal sent by “high quality” firms to 
reduce the consumers’ information gap on the quality of their products. Thus, voluntary 
labeling works well if enough consumers know the value of a product characteristic, if 
producers have a credible method of labeling their products, and if consumers are 
skeptical of firms that do not label their products.  
In contrast, Fishman and Hagerty (2003) develop a model in which a subset of 
consumers does not either comprehend disclosure or understand the importance of the 
undisclosed attribute. Also, Mathios (2000) found that in the market for salad dressings 
there is less than perfect unraveling of information, meaning some of the firms with 
dressings in the middle range of the fat distribution chose not to disclose, and some of the 
worst chose to disclose.  
These models indicate that mandatory labeling may have an impact on product 
choices. Mandatory disclosures in contrast to voluntary disclosures make it practicable 
for consumers to judge quality before purchasing a product by establishing a quality 
scale, requiring testing of quality, and mandating a reporting format. Caswell and 
Mojduszka (1996) state that the presence of imperfect information, transaction costs in 
acquiring and using information and externalities may make private markets for quality 
work inefficiently. Thus, quality signaling through mandatory product labeling and 
information disclosure requirements encourages market incentives with relatively limited 
government involvement.  
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Information about food quality may have public good characteristics.  Information 
is an economic good that markets do not always create and disseminate efficiently, as 
they would handle other kinds of goods and services. The government can step in to 
provide information that private markets may not provide when that information is 
needed by individuals to make better personal decisions. In this case, food quality (origin 
in our case) may be over- or undersupplied and government often intervenes in an 
attempt to correct or mitigate imperfections. Mandatory labeling of origin has been in 
practice in some states of the United States where products from other countries must be 
labeled according to their origin whereas domestic products are not labeled. For example, 
Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi, and Louisiana have origin labeling requirements for 
certain seafood products. However voluntary state and regional labeling has also been 
implemented in the United States. Some products sold in grocery stores are identified 
with the area of production in the United States. Some examples are: Washington apples, 
Vermont maple syrup, Mississippi farm-raised catfish, Alaskan salmon, Georgia Vidalia 
onions, Idaho potatoes, and Jersey fresh produce.4 
The fact that some retailers already label seafood as to its source indicates that 
market participants will provide country of origin information in response to market 
demand. This suggests there is no compelling market failure argument regarding 
MCOOL implementation. This stems from a lack of evidence of barriers to private 
provision of voluntary COOL should consumer demand support the increased costs of 
such labeling. To analyze the question of market failure warranting MCOOL law 
                                                 
4 State and regional labeling programs, such as “Washington Apples,” “Idaho potatoes,” and “California 
Grown” do not meet the law requirement and so cannot be used in lieu of COOL (USDA-AMS, 2004). 
Here we consider such labeling programs as Voluntary COOL. 
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implementation, we consider consumer and total welfare under alternate scenarios such 
as voluntary labeling, no labeling, and total labeling to compare with partial MCOOL.   
While no one has specifically studied the economic impacts of partial coverage of 
the MCOOL law, others have noted that advantage may be taken of loopholes. For 
example, in their study of the consequences of COOL in the pork industry, Iqbal, Kim, 
and Rude (2006) write “(...) if U.S. retailers chose not to incur the extra costs of stocking 
Canadian pork, there are alternative outlets for Canadian pork including processed 
products and the HRI trade (p. 19).”5 Similarly, USDA-AMS (2004) states “(…) the 
majority of the sales of the covered commodity are through channels not affected by this 
rule, which provides substantial marketing opportunities for products without verifiable 
country of origin claims.” Another example is Tim Hammonds (2003), the president of 
the Food Marketing Institute (FMI), who says “(…) ranchers unable to document the 
history of their animals will find themselves unable to sell to supermarkets forcing their 
beef into the export or foodservice sectors, which are not covered under COOL 
regulation.”  
Discussion on the implications of MCOOL implementation is not novel. Krissoff 
et al (2004) examined in detail the economic rationale behind the various claims about 
the effects of mandatory country-of-origin labeling on the beef, pork, and fruits and 
vegetables industries. The assumptions and findings are influenced heavily by the nature 
and structure of these markets. Other implications have been outlined in discussing the 
effects of MCOOL implementation by Peel (2008), Meyer (2008), and VanSickle (2008) 
for the beef, pork, and fruits and vegetables industries respectively. To date there is no 
                                                 
5 HRI trade refers to Hotel, Restaurant, and Institutional trade. 
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comprehensive report on the partial implementation of MCOOL law for the seafood 
industry. The seafood industry is very different from the meat industry as most seafood 
consumed in the United States is imported from developing countries while meat 
consumed in United States is mostly domestic.  
This work is therefore a step towards analyzing the effect of partial MCOOL 
policy in the seafood industry taking into consideration the nature of the industry. The 
contributions of this paper are its distinct focus on the economic impacts of partial 
coverage of MCOOL in the seafood industry on consumers and sellers, and the question 
of market failure warranting MCOOL implementation in the United States. This paper 
also accounts for imperfect competition among retailers and the foodservice sectors, and 
models consumer heterogeneity characterized by different preferences for quality. A 
related work is USDA-AMS (2004), which is a detailed study of MCOOL in the seafood 
industry. Using a CGE model, the study determines costs incurred in the supply chain as 
a result of this regulation. It assumes that retailers are perfectly competitive and that 
COOL does not result in increased consumer demand for domestic products. Plastina and 
Giannakas (2007) account for imperfect competition among retailers for specialty crops, 
and consider consumer and producer heterogeneity in determining the welfare effects on 
supply chain participants when COOL is implemented. Their model assumes total 
implementation of COOL. 
The Model 
The model builds on Zago and Pick (2004) who analyze the welfare impact of 
labeling policies on agricultural commodities with credence attributes. Our analysis 
considers two scenarios, namely, the absence of MCOOL in the market and the presence 
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of MCOOL law implementation. In the absence of MCOOL law implementation, we 
consider two cases. In the first case, there is no labeling and the origin of seafood cannot 
be distinguished by consumers. Consequently, quality based on origin cannot be 
ascertained (product appears undifferentiated to consumers), resulting in imperfect and 
asymmetric information. While consumers are unable to differentiate domestic fish from 
foreign, we assume that sellers in retail and foodservice sectors can differentiate them. 
The other case is voluntarily labeling of domestic seafood in the retail sector. We study 
this case to consider fish such as salmon, which was labeled prior to the implementation 
of the law. This case will also help us determine under which circumstances retailers 
would choose to voluntarily label. 
In the presence of MCOOL law implementation, however, the sectors are 
segmented with quality differentiation generating a higher price for domestic than foreign 
fish.6 Retail and foodservice establishments that implement COOL can now exercise 
second-degree price discrimination, where consumers self-select themselves by choosing 
between two price-quality bundles. Thus, the sectors with MCOOL implementation are 
segmented into low- and high-quality markets.  Two cases are considered in the presence 
of MCOOL law implementation for welfare implications: current partial MCOOL 
implementation (retail sector labeled) and total MCOOL implementation (both retail and 
foodservice sectors labeled). 
The seafood supply chain is characterized by fish farmers (harvesters/producers), 
intermediaries (processors, importers, wholesalers and handlers) and retailers/foodservice 
                                                 
6 Assuming that minimum average cost of production is greater for high quality than for low quality, it 
follows that market equilibrium prices Hp and Lp satisfy the condition LH pp  (Antle, 2001). 
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establishments. For simplicity we consider two levels: firms and establishments; where 
firms include fish farmers and intermediaries, and establishments are defined as 
retailers/foodservice establishments. Firms are further classified as foreign and domestic 
based on the origin of seafood supplied.  In this model, domestic and foreign firms 
supplying seafood are considered to be perfectly competitive. Following previous 
literature (Sexton et al., 2003; Richards and Patterson, 2003), we assume retail and 
foodservice establishments exercise market power over consumers. 
We consider a one-period game under vertical differentiation, with two qualities 
for a single good. The domestic country is the United States and the foreign country is the 
major exporter of seafood to the United States. We assume the quality, k , of seafood is 
exogenous. The quality of seafood products is defined here to depend on location and 
conditions of catch or aquaculture, processing, and handling throughout the supply chain 
(Caswell, 2006). In keeping with the assumption that the domestic seafood industry is 
regulated by the government with stricter policies, and the foreign seafood industry has to 
follow certain standards, but may not be subjected to stringent enforcement, the domestic 
firm produces high-quality seafood and the foreign firm produces products that are 
assumed to be of lower quality or are at least perceived as such. Thus, quality can be 
either low ( Lk ) or high ( Hk ). Domestic and foreign firms produce seafood with different 
production technologies and costs of production. Parameters Lc  and Hc  reflect 
production costs for the two qualities such that HL cc  . That is, foreign fish can be 
produced (and sold) at a lower price than domestic fish. 
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Supply side 
Following Zago and Pick (2004) and Bureau, Marette, and Schiavina (1998), we 
assume each firm j  (supplier of seafood to retail/foodservice), where 1j  to n , 
maximizes its profit ij , and produces a quantity ijq  of the type HLi ,  where i  
represents quality. The aggregate supply )( iii wQq  is the summation of individual 
supply ijq  for each quality i . iw  is the market price of selling seafood to the retail or 
foodservice sector. The overall surplus of the firms, i , is the sum of individual profits 
ij . The analytical expression of surplus for firms of quality i  seafood is:7 
(1) 2)(5.0 ijiiijij qcwq    
We consider a quadratic cost function, i.e., cost increases at an increasing rate and there 
is no decreasing marginal costs. This way, the law of diminishing marginal returns is 
followed. The expression for aggregate supply function is given as:     
(2) iiii cwwQ /)(          
Demand side 
To analyze consumer welfare, consider a conceptual model of heterogeneous 
consumers. The model is a variant of the classic model of vertical product differentiation 
by Mussa and Rosen (1978) and explicitly accounts for differences in consumer attitudes 
towards quality of fish. There is a continuum of consumers indexed by their preference  
                                                 
7 The first order conditions imply 00:00
11
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(or willingness to pay) for fish quality, which is uniformly distributed over ],0[   with 
density /1 .8 We assume that each consumer buys at most one unit of the good with 
quality k . The associated utility is: 
(3) pkU             
where p  is the price of the good of quality k . Aggregate demand depends on 
consumers’ beliefs about the quality, i.e., consumers’ information about the origin of 
seafood available in the market. Without COOL, consumers believe they are consuming 
seafood of expected quality k  while with COOL, consumers relate origin information of 
seafood to their perceived quality, denoted by Hk  and Lk . This assumption follows Lusk 
et al. (2006) who write “…consumers will make an assumption about the average quality 
of the product on the market. Because the market will contain products from a variety of 
origins, the expected quality of the product on the market might fall well below the 
perceived quality of the domestic product (p. 286).” We assume that with asymmetric 
information in the non-labeled market, consumers evaluate seafood quality using a simple 
average: 2)( LH kkk  . 
Pre-MCOOL: No Labeling  
In the absence of MCOOL law implementation (no labeling), origin and 
production method cannot be determined by the consumers. That is, there is imperfect 
information in the market. Further, there is asymmetric information as sellers are aware 
of the origin and production of fish while consumers cannot identify them. In the extreme 
                                                 
8 It should be noted that as the lower bound of the taste distribution is equal to zero, the market will not be 
entirely covered, i.e., some consumers prefer not to buy the good offered. 
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case, if a consumer has no information about the quality of the product, sellers will resort 
to selling the lowest possible quality of a good.  
We make the assumption that in the absence of labeling, the retail and foodservice 
sectors sell only foreign seafood because, in the context of this model, they do not have 
an incentive to sell domestic seafood.9 Figure 1 panel a shows schematically the seafood 
market in the absence of MCOOL law implementation.   
The retail and foodservice sectors are considered two separate markets. We 
consider two separate markets because with the implementation of MCOOL the 
foodservice sector is “exempt” from labeling. In both markets, consumers are 
heterogeneous in their preference for quality and are postulated to differ in the utility or 
marginal willingness to pay that they derive from the quality of seafood. We assume that 
consumers have the same valuation for quality in the two markets. A unique price p  
develops in both sectors and consumers have an expected quality k  as mentioned above. 
The conditional indirect utility function of a consumer with preference parameter 
θ in the retail and foodservice market is given by:   
                                                 
9 The framework considered here implies that consumers do not know the actual quality of seafood 
supplied and would consume foreign seafood in the absence of labeling because there is also uncertainty 
about the extent to which it is potentially unsafe for their health. However, when information is available 
about the origin of seafood, some consumers are willing to pay more for domestic seafood. 
In the absence of information regarding the origin of seafood, domestic and foreign fish are marketed 
together and the price received by establishments is the same regardless of which product is produced 
(pooling equilibrium; see Akerlof 1970). The absence of a premium for domestic seafood when they are not 
segregated, coupled with increased costs of producing domestic seafood, result in the profitability of the 
domestic fish being lower than that of foreign fish. In this case the supply of domestic seafood is not 
incentive compatible; market forces lead to failure of the market to satisfy expressed consumer demands. 
Hence, only foreign seafood is sold in the non-labeled sector. 
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(4) 
                                                                    nothing consumes if  
 priceat  quality  expected of seafood ofunit  a consumes if
0
pkpkU

    
  The indifferent consumer between consuming a unit of seafood and not 
consuming can be characterized as: 
(5) 
k
p0   
Consumers with valuation for quality greater than 0  will buy seafood and 
consumers with valuation for quality lower than 0  will not buy seafood. Thus, the 
demand for seafood in a market with no differentiation can be found by aggregating the 
quantity consumed by consumers with   > 0 . Normalizing 1 , the demand at retail 
or foodservice with no labeling corresponds to:  
(6) 
k
ppD  1)(0   
To determine the equilibrium quantity and price in the absence of MCOOL 
implementation, we solve the profit-maximization function for the retail and foodservice 
sectors. Then, derived demands at the retail and foodservice levels are equated with the 
supply of foreign firms. The two sectors are each characterized by N identical retailers 
and N identical foodservice establishments competing with each other and who have 
market power over consumers. The individual retailer/foodservice establishment m  
),...,1( Nm   maximizes profit given by: 
(7) mL
NC
mq
qwQp
m
00 ])([max
0
            
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where )1()( 00 QkQp   is the inverse demand for non-labeled seafood in retail or 
foodservice. Lw  represents the price of foreign seafood paid by retailers and foodservice 
establishments to foreign firms.10 The superscript NC refers to the scenario with no 
labeling. The first-order conditions of (7) imply:  
(8) 

0
0m
NC
m
q
   Lm wQk  11 0  
where 
0
0
0
0
Q
q
q
Q m
m
m 
  represent the conjectural variation elasticity of the 
retailer/foodservice establishment m .  Because we assume identical retailers and 
foodservice establishments, each firm’s conjectural variation elasticity is identical in 
equilibrium, i.e.,   m....21 . In this context, the firm’s individual first-order 
condition corresponds to the aggregate first-order condition, i.e., 
(9) LwQk  ))1(1( 0    
Equation (9) represents the aggregate derived demand facing foreign firms from the retail 
or the foodservice sector. 
  When the parameter ]1,0[  is zero, it implies the establishments have no 
market power, while 1  implies perfect collusion.  
Equating derived demand (9) facing the foreign firms, aggregated over retail and 
foodservice establishments, with supply (2) indicates the following:  
(10) 
L
LL
c
w
k
wk 
)(2
 
                                                 
10 We assume the retail and foodservice sector incur the same costs of purchasing foreign seafood and other 
costs are assumed to be zero for simplicity. 
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where )1(   . Solving for Lw  gives the equilibrium quantities and prices:  
(11) 
L
L
L ck
ckw
2
2*
   
(12) 
Lck
kQ
2
*
0    
(13) 
L
L
ck
kckp
2
)2(*

 
  
The superscript notation * refers to equilibrium. Welfare measures with no labeling can 
be considered as a benchmark when evaluating the effects of MCOOL implementation.  
Using (13), consumers’ surplus with no labeling (indexed by NC) can be 
calculated by integrating consumer utility at equilibrium for consumers who consume a 
unit of seafood with willingness to pay for quality greater than 0  in foodservice/retail: 
(14) 
2
3
*
1
)2(2
)(
0 L
NC
ck
kdpkCS     
Equation (14) is used to aggregate consumer surplus in the two sectors to get expected 
consumer welfare: 
(15) 
2
3
)2( L
NC
ck
kCS    
Equation (15) shows that consumer welfare depends positively on the expected quality of 
seafood and negatively on the costs of producing low-quality fish and the market power 
of establishments. 
For the purpose of welfare analysis of MCOOL implementation, we also compute 
real consumer surplus. Real consumer surplus considers that while consumers believe 
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seafood is of quality k , it is in fact Lk . The aggregate real consumer surplus for the same 
set of consumers and prices in equilibrium as before is given as: 
(16) 
2
1
*
)2(
))2((
)(
0 L
LL
L
NC
real ck
ckkkkkdpkCS 
  


 
where LH kkk  . Under real consumer surplus, both the price and the indifferent 
consumer between buying or not is determined according to the value of the quality 
actually consumed Lk . 
Profit earned by retail and foodservice sectors can be calculated by substituting 
prices and quantities in equation (7) with equilibrium prices and quantities. The 
expression for total profit aggregated over retail and foodservice sectors is given as: 
(17) 
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Equation (17) shows that profit depends positively on the expected quality of seafood and 
market power parameter, and negatively on the costs of producing low-quality fish. Total 
welfare is the summation of real consumer surplus and profit which is: 
(18)     
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Pre-MCOOL: Voluntary COOL at Retail 
Prior to the implementation of MCOOL, some retailers may have voluntarily 
disclosed origin information for domestic seafood and may have chosen not to provide 
information about foreign seafood whose value to consumers may be less than its 
associated disclosure cost. Disclosing information about domestic seafood may be 
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especially valuable when consumers have a strong willingness to pay for domestic 
seafood. The retailer can then segment the market and implement profitable second 
degree price discrimination. We examine this case as an alternative benchmark scenario. 
In this case the retail sector will differentiate domestic seafood (identified by 
labels) from foreign seafood. In the retail sector domestic seafood is indexed by quality 
Hk  whereas non-labeled seafood is indexed by quality k . In the absence of labels 
consumers cannot identify the origin of seafood and perceive it to be of average quality. 
Perceived quality Hk  is greater than average quality k  and corresponding prices for 
seafood at retail are Hp  and p  with ppH  .  
Again let us consider two firms, domestic and foreign, selling to two sectors: 
retail and foodservice. We assume all domestic seafood is supplied to retail because it is 
labeled and foreign seafood is supplied to both the foodservice (non-labeled sector) and 
the retail sector, where it is not labeled. A schematic representation of this case is shown 
in Figure 1 panel b. 
As in the previous model, there is a continuum of consumers with preference   
for quality. With voluntary labeling facilitating differentiation of domestic from foreign 
seafood in the retail sector, the indirect utility of a consumer is given by:   
(19) 
                                                                    nothing consumes if    
sector   retailin quality  expected of seafood ofunit  a consumes if       
       sector     retailin  seafood domestic ofunit  a consumes if
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Similarly, in the foodservice sector it is: 
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(20)  
                                                                           nothing consumes if
sector   efoodservicin quality  expected of seafood ofunit  a  consumes if       
0
  pkU   
   where Hkk  . There are two indifferent consumers in the retail sector: one is 
indifferent between consuming domestic seafood and non-labeled seafood )( H , and one 
between consuming non-labeled seafood and not consuming at all )( 0 . Similarly, in the 
foodservice sector, consumers are indifferent between consuming non-labeled seafood 
and not consuming at all ( 0 ). Accordingly, the indifferent consumers (using 19 and 20) 
and the demand for each quality of seafood can be found by aggregating the quantity 
consumed of each type in the two sectors and are given at retail by:  
(21)    
  
 
where HD  and 0D  are demand for domestic and non-labeled seafood in the retail sector. 
In foodservice, they are given by: 
(22)  
 
where 0D  is demand for non-labeled seafood in the foodservice sector. 
Voluntary labeling entails costs to retailers and domestic firms. Domestic fish 
producers and harvesters incur the cost of establishing and maintaining a recordkeeping 
system for origin and production information, and for product identification, labor, and 
training. Consequently retailers need to incur costs associated with labeling domestic 
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seafood. The cost of labeling/recordkeeping borne by retailers is denoted as b and 
operating costs (segregation and identity preservation costs) are denoted as y.  
To determine equilibrium quantity and price, the profit-maximization function for 
the individual retailer and foodservice is solved first as each retailer m maximizes its 
profit given by: 
(23) mLHmHHHH
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000,
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where 00 ),( QkQkkQQp HHHHH   and )1(),( 00 QQkQQp HH  . The 
superscript VC refers to a scenario with voluntary labeling at retail. The first-order 
conditions of (23) imply: 
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iQ  can be HQ  or 0Q . Assume   0H , therefore   0H . Equation (24) 
represents the derived demand facing domestic and foreign firms in the retail sector after 
solving simultaneously for HQ  and 0Q . Each foodservice establishment m maximizes its 
profit given by: 
(25) mL
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where )1()( 00 QkQp   is the inverse demand for seafood in the foodservice sector. 
The first-order conditions of (25) imply: 
(26) LwQk  )1( 0  
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where )1(    and 
0
0
0
0
Q
q
q
Q

 . Equation (26) represents the derived demand facing 
foreign firms in the foodservice sector. 
With voluntary labeling, two markets emerge: one for high-quality and the other 
for low-quality seafood. Domestic firms supplying high-quality seafood incur an 
additional cost y while the foreign firms’ supply function for low-quality seafood remains 
unchanged. Following equations (1) and (2), supply in the two markets can be written as:  
(27) 
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 Equating aggregate derived demand of the retail and foodservice sectors (24 and 
26) with supply of domestic and foreign firms (27) indicates the following: 
(28) 
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Using (28), equilibrium quantities and prices in the two sectors, and prices of 
domestic and foreign firms can be derived. Consumers’ surplus in the retail and 
foodservice sectors, identified by subscript r for retail and f for foodservice are given as: 
(29) 
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The expected consumer surplus with voluntary labeling is obtained by 
aggregating consumer surplus in the retail and foodservice sector. Similar to our previous 
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argument, real consumer surplus in retail and foodservice can be derived by substituting 
real quality supplied in the non-labeled market Lk  in place of k . 
Profit can be calculated by substituting prices and quantities in equation (23 and 
25) with equilibrium prices and quantities. Total welfare is expressed as the summation 
of real consumer surplus and profit. 
Expressions for equation (29), for profit, and for total welfare are messy and 
complicated for doing analysis through comparative statics, so analysis is done using 
numerical simulations. Numerical simulation details can be found in the analysis section. 
Partial MCOOL: MCOOL Implementation in Retail  
The current U.S. regulation requires MCOOL in the retail sector, so consumers 
can distinguish between the domestic and foreign seafood indexed by quality Hk  and Lk  
respectively in the model. Domestic seafood is assumed to be perceived to be of higher 
quality than foreign seafood, i.e., LH kk  , and corresponding prices for seafood at retail 
are Hp  and Lp  with LH pp  . We assume domestic seafood (higher quality) is supplied 
to retail because it is identifiable through labels. Foreign seafood (lower quality) is 
supplied to both the non-labeled foodservice sector and the labeled retail sector, where it 
is labeled as such. Retailers can now convey product quality information to consumers 
via origin labels and a separating equilibrium may be attained that efficiently sorts 
consumers into markets for different qualities with corresponding prices. However, in the 
foodservice sector, in the absence of labeling, only foreign seafood is supplied (see 
footnote 9). Figure 1 panel c shows how MCOOL facilitates quality differentiation at 
retail. 
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The indirect utility of a consumer in the retail and foodservice sectors in this case 
is given as:   
(30)  
                                                                   nothing consumes if
sector   (retail) labeledin  seafoodforeign  ofunit  a consumes if
sector (retail) labeledin  seafood domestic ofunit  a consumes if
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Similarly, 
(31) 
                                                                  nothing consumes if
sector   labeled-nonin  seafoodforeign  ofunit  a  consumes if
0
  pkU   
HL kkk   where . Using (30) the indifferent consumers and the demand for each 
quality ( LH , ) of seafood in retail are given by:  
 
(32)    
  
 Using (31), the indifferent consumer and demand for non-labeled seafood are given by 
the following equations in the foodservice sector: 
(33)  
 
As mentioned earlier there are costs associated with MCOOL implementation. 
MCOOL requires systems to be implemented to ensure that origin and production 
information is transferred from producers to the next buyers of their products, and that 
the information is maintained for the required amount of time. With MCOOL 
implementation in retail, domestic firms bear operating costs (segregation and identity 
preservation costs) y whereas foreign firms do not. Exporters are assumed to not bear 
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operating costs with MCOOL because they inform the country of origin with labels to the 
“ultimate purchaser” anyway, irrespective of MCOOL implementation. Ultimate 
purchaser has been defined as the last U.S. person who will receive the product in the 
form in which it was imported. Similar to the voluntary labeling scenario, retailers incur 
costs of labeling b. However, this cost applies to all seafood sold in retail, which includes 
domestic and foreign seafood. 
Each retailer m maximizes its profit given by: 
(34) mLLLHLmHHLHH
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where LLHHHLHH QkQkkQQp ),(  and  LHLLHL QQkQQp  1),(  are the 
inverse demand for domestic and foreign seafood at retail. The first-order conditions of 
(34) imply: 
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Equation (35) represents the derived demand facing domestic and foreign firms in the 
retail sector after solving simultaneously for HQ  and LQ . 
Each foodservice establishment m maximizes its profit given by: 
(36) mL
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where )1()( 00 QkQp   is the inverse demand for seafood in the foodservice sector. 
The superscript PC refers to a scenario with partial MCOOL implementation. The first-
order conditions of (36) imply: 
(37) LwQk  )1( 0  
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The above equation represents the derived demand facing foreign firms in the foodservice 
sector. 
Supply in the high- and low-quality markets can be written as:  
(38) 
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 Equating aggregate derived demand of the retail and foodservice sectors (35 and 
37) with supply of domestic and foreign firms (38) indicates the following: 
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Consumers’ surplus in the retail and foodservice sectors for this case are given as: 
(40) 
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The expected consumer welfare after implementing MCOOL is obtained by 
aggregating consumer surplus in the retail and foodservice sector. The expressions for 
real consumer surplus, profit, and total welfare are derived as before. The expressions are 
not reported here but analyzed using numerical simulations in the analysis section. 
Total MCOOL: MCOOL Implementation in Retail and Foodservice  
Finally, we consider the case where MCOOL is implemented in both the retail 
and foodservice sectors. There is no informational asymmetry, consumers are able to 
determine the origin of seafood and make informed choices in both sectors. An important 
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outcome of uniform regulation in both sectors is that there is no scope for diversion. 
Figure 1 panel d shows the case of a totally differentiated market. Here, labeling cost b is 
applicable to both the foodservice and retail establishments. As before, cost y is borne 
only by the domestic firms. The profit-maximization equation for the individual 
retailer/foodservice establishment m becomes: 
(41) mLLLHLmHHLHH
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where LLHHHLHH QkQkkQQp ),(  and  LHLLHL QQkQQp  1),(  are the 
inverse demand for domestic and foreign seafood in retail or foodservice. The superscript 
TC refers to a scenario with total MCOOL implementation. All other variables are as 
previously defined. The first order conditions of (41) imply: 
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The above equations can be solved for HQ  and LQ  to get the derived demand 
facing domestic and foreign firms in the retail and foodservice sectors. Equating 
aggregate derived demand of the retail and foodservice sectors (42) with supply of the 
domestic and foreign firms (38) indicates the following: 
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Consumer surplus at the retail or foodservice sector when both sectors are labeled 
is given by: 
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Expected consumer surplus is the same as real consumer surplus in a totally 
differentiated market as there is no mismatch between quality of seafood supplied and 
consumed. 
Analysis 
In this section, we examine the extent to which diversion occurs as a result of 
partial MCOOL implementation and the associated welfare effects. Diversion can be 
related to the concept of ‘leakage’ in the emissions leakage literature. Leakage refers to 
increases in production and associated emissions among unregulated producers that occur 
as a direct consequence of incomplete environmental regulation (CCAP, 2005; and 
RGGI, 2007). Fowlie (2009) states that when there is incomplete regulation, i.e., when 
pollution regulation is applied to only a subset of firms in a polluting industry, substantial 
leakage may occur since production at regulated firms can be substituted for unregulated 
production. Similarly, the partial implementation of MCOOL may lead to diversion or 
leakage of lower quality imports to the non-labeled sector. We define diversion as a 
percentage of the relative share of foreign seafood increase in the foodservice sector with 
partial implementation of MCOOL. 
In our analysis, we consider the pre-MCOOL case (no labeling and voluntary 
labeling) as the benchmark to determine the effect of MCOOL (partial and total 
implementation) on welfare. Our welfare analysis focuses on consumer surplus (expected 
and real), profit, and total welfare (consumer surplus and profit). 
Using Mathematica 6.0, we first calibrate the model to have positive prices and 
quantities in equilibrium. To calibrate the model, we normalize Lc  and 1Lk ,  fix   = 
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0.5, set costs associated with labeling 07.0b  and 0025.0y , and then determine 
values for Hc  and Hk  in the feasible region (positive prices and quantities in 
equilibrium). In order to analyze the effect of change in quality on welfare and diversion 
within the feasible region, we fix Hc  at 4 and vary Hk  from 110% to 210% of Lk . We 
allow Hk  to have differences in quality from 10% to 100%. Finally, we vary labeling 
costs b from 0.05 to 0.15 for Hk  = 1.1 and 2 to analyze the incentive for retailers to 
voluntarily label domestic seafood as opposed to not label at all, by comparing profits 
across four scenarios – No Labeling, Voluntary COOL, Partial MCOOL, and Total 
MCOOL. All other parameters are set at the values mentioned above. 
Table 1 summarizes welfare magnitudes for fixed parameter values for the four 
scenarios considered. The “high quality” parameter Hk  is set at 1.5, and market power 
parameter   is set at 0.5, b is set at 0.07, all other parameters are set at values mentioned 
earlier.  
The first two rows of Table 1 show the comparative magnitude of consumer 
surplus (expected and real) across four scenarios, namely, no labeling, voluntary COOL, 
partial MCOOL, and total MCOOL. For fixed parameter values, expected consumer 
surplus is greatest with partial MCOOL and real consumer surplus is greatest with total 
MCOOL. Expected consumer welfare in the partial MCOOL case does not take into 
account the real quality Lk  of foreign fish supplied to consumers in the non-labeled 
sector. Rather it is based on consumers’ belief of quality k , where k > Lk . Thus, while 
consumers expect to be getting quality k , they are in fact consuming seafood of 
perceived lower quality. Because consumer utility is dependent on the quality of the 
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product consumed, consumer surplus is necessarily higher when consumers believe they 
are getting k  rather than Lk . Considering that consumers are truly consuming quality Lk , 
real consumer surplus is greatest with total MCOOL. When both sectors are labeled, 
expected quality is equal to real quality, and consumers are aware of the quality of fish 
they consume and can make informed choices.  
Real consumer surplus is greater under voluntary COOL than partial MCOOL 
because the quantity of perceived expected-quality fish consumed in retail, in the 
voluntary COOL scenario, is greater than the quantity of perceived low-quality fish 
consumed in retail under partial MCOOL. Equilibrium quantity comparisons for fixed 
parameter values under the two scenarios can be seen in Table 2. 
Profit is greatest under voluntary labeling followed by partial MCOOL, No 
labeling, and total MCOOL as shown in Table 1. A non-labeled market can lead sellers to 
take advantage of consumer misinformation. The absence of labels allows sellers to 
masquerade sales of low-quality fish as higher quality. As a result, consumers pay a 
higher price for low-quality seafood, which increases profit for establishments selling 
low-quality fish in the non-labeled market. Under voluntary labeling, retailers label 
domestic fish but not foreign fish. However, under partial MCOOL, retailers must label 
all fish. Thus, under voluntary COOL retailers take advantage of consumers’ willingness-
to-pay for domestic fish and their ignorance of quality of the foreign fish. This is 
reflected in equilibrium with the higher price-quality ratio for low-quality fish sold in 
both the retail and foodservice sectors under voluntary labeling compared to partial 
MCOOL. This leads to greater profit under voluntary COOL scenario. 
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Table 1 shows that total welfare is greatest under voluntary COOL, followed by 
partial MCOOL, total MCOOL, and No labeling. The ranking follows that of profit, 
meaning that the profit component in total welfare dominates the effect of real consumer 
surplus. 
a. Diversion and the effect of quality on diversion  
We examine the effect of partial MCOOL on the quantity of low-quality fish 
diverted to the non-labeled market. We focus on the foodservice sector for our 
calculations of diversion because it is exempt under current MCOOL law. Before 
MCOOL implementation, neither retail nor foodservice sectors were required to be 
labeled. As a result there is no potential for diversion. However, with MCOOL 
implemented in the retail sector, low-quality fish may be diverted to the non-labeled 
sector. One way to measure diversion to the non-labeled market is to compare the 
quantity of low-quality fish sold to the foodservice sector (non-labeled) prior to partial 
MCOOL implementation, i.e., NCQ*0 , with the quantity sold under partial MCOOL, i.e., 
PCQ*0 . Substituting parameter values, the quantity sold to the foodservice sector before 
partial MCOOL is smaller than under implementation of the law. This would indicate 
diversion of low-quality fish to the non-labeled market. However, this measure may be 
misleading because it is possible that the total quantity of fish sold in the U.S. market 
(high- and low-quality) increases with the implementation of partial MCOOL. Thus, a 
relative measure of diversion is more accurate.  
Diversion is measured by comparing the relative quantity of low-quality fish sold 
in the foodservice sector under partial implementation of MCOOL to the relative quantity 
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sold in the absence of its implementation. The formula used to calculate diversion is 
given as: 
(45) 
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Diversion is expressed as a percentage of relative share of low-quality fish sold in 
foodservice post and pre-MCOOL implementation. A diagrammatic representation is 
shown in Figure 2.  
We find that at fixed parameter values, there is evidence of diversion as shown in 
Figure 3. At the initial parameter value of 1.1Hk , the diversion percentage has a value 
of 7.5 percent. This means that the share of low-quality fish in the foodservice sector with 
partial MCOOL is relatively larger than the share pre-MCOOL. Under partial MCOOL 
the price-quality ratio of seafood in the foodservice sector is lower than with pre-
MCOOL. . Therefore, non-labeled fish from the food service sector under MCOOL is 
more attractive to consumers. This can be explained as follows. The pre-MCOOL market 
is characterized by the supply of low-quality foreign fish only, which consumers perceive 
to be of expected average quality k . With partial MCOOL, high-quality domestic fish is 
also supplied to the labeled sector whereas the non-labeled sector behaves similarly to the 
pre-MCOOL market. Price competition in the partial MCOOL case between domestic 
and foreign seafood results in a lower price for expected quality fish in the non-labeled 
sector than in the pre-MCOOL case. Thus, the quantity of low-quality fish sold in the 
non-labeled sector after partial MCOOL implementation is greater than pre-MCOOL. 
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Refer to Table 2 to compare equilibrium price and quantity across pre- and post-MCOOL 
scenarios. 
Figure 3 shows that the greater the quality differences between domestic and 
foreign fish, the greater will be the diversion to the non-labeled market. The same 
intuition as above applies, i.e., this is explained by the larger difference in the price-
quality ratio. 
b. Effect of increasing quality differences between domestic and foreign seafood 
on consumer surplus  
Expected consumer surplus increases in all four scenarios with increasing quality 
differences between domestic and foreign fish (Figure 4). In contrast, real consumer 
surplus increases for total MCOOL, but decreases for partial MCOOL, voluntary 
labeling, and No labeling (Figure 5). Real consumer surplus decreases for the No labeling 
case as consumers in reality are being supplied with low-quality fish despite their belief 
they are consuming fish of expected quality. As Hk  increases, expected quality ( k ) 
increases, which increases the price and reduces the quantity of (foreign) fish consumed. 
However, the real quality Lk  does not change with an increase in the quality difference 
between domestic and foreign seafood. Thus, real consumer surplus decreases under No 
labeling as price-quality ratio increases with no change in real quality, which reduces the 
quantity consumed. 
Increasing quality differences between domestic and foreign seafood results in 
real consumer surplus decreasing under voluntary COOL and partial MCOOL. This is 
because voluntary COOL and partial MCOOL scenarios are characterized by labeled and 
non-labeled sectors. The non-labeled sector under these scenarios behaves similarly to the 
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No labeling scenario. That is, increase in Hk  does not change the real quality Lk  
supplied. Thus, the price-quality ratio under voluntary COOL and partial MCOOL 
increases in the non-labeled sector with increasing quality differences. Under total 
MCOOL implementation, high- and low-quality labeled seafood are sold in both the 
sectors. With increasing quality differences, the price-quality ratio of high-quality 
seafood sold in retail  is lower than the price-quality ratio of high-quality seafood sold 
under voluntary COOL and partial MCOOL scenarios. Similarly, the price-quality ratio 
of low-quality seafood sold in retail and foodservice sectors is lower than the ratio of 
low-quality seafood sold under voluntary COOL and partial MCOOL scenarios. This 
smaller price-quality ratio indicates that real consumer surplus becomes greater under 
total MCOOL compared with the other two scenarios. 
Figure 5 shows that at low differences in quality between domestic and foreign 
fish, real consumer surplus under partial MCOOL is greater than total MCOOL, and 
voluntary COOL gives the highest real consumer surplus. This quickly reverses as the 
difference in quality between domestic and foreign fish increases. This is because when 
the quality difference becomes larger and consumer value quality, labeling allows 
consumers to sort qualities and benefit from it. 
c. Effect of increasing quality differences between domestic and foreign seafood 
on profit and total welfare  
The effect of increasing the quality difference on profit is shown in Figure 6. As 
Hk  increases, profit increases. Profit increases the most for scenarios characterized by 
non-labeled markets, as the perceived expected quality of fish increases but in reality 
low-quality fish is supplied. 
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We analyze the effect of varying labeling costs on profit of firms across scenarios 
by considering two cases – low difference in quality ( 1.1Hk  and 1Lk ) and high 
difference in quality ( 2Hk  and 1Lk ). These cases are shown in Figure 7a and Figure 
7b. Across both cases it can be seen that as cost increases, profit of firms decreases. 
Increase in labeling costs does not alter the ranking price-quality ratio for low-quality 
seafood across scenarios, i.e., price-quality ratio is higher for voluntary COOL compared 
to other scenarios. Thus, profit under voluntary labeling remains the highest. At low 
difference in quality (Figure 7a) and low labeling costs, profits are higher under total 
MCOOL but reverses as labeling costs increase. No labeling becomes preferable to total 
MCOOL with increasing b because firms under No labeling scenario bear no costs 
whereas firms under total MCOOL bear costs of labeling both in the retail and 
foodservice sectors. Compared with a No labeling scenario, retail sector will voluntarily 
label domestic seafood because identification of origin leads domestic firms supply to a 
labeled market, consumers are willing to pay for quality, and the benefits of labeling 
outweigh the costs, in turn retailers make higher profits.   
Total welfare has two components - real consumer surplus and profit. Figure 8 
shows that increasing differences in quality between domestic and foreign fish ( Hk ) 
increases total welfare for voluntary labeling, partial MCOOL, and total MCOOL but 
decreases total welfare for the No labeling scenario. The increase in total welfare is 
explained by the increase in profit with increasing quality differences, as profit 
overweighs real consumer surplus in magnitude. In contrast, the decrease in total welfare 
is explained by the decrease in real consumer surplus that overweighs profit in magnitude 
under No labeling scenario.  
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Conclusion 
The seafood market in the United States is characterized increasingly by imported 
fish and shellfish from developing countries. With the implementation of MCOOL in 
April 2005 in the seafood market, and the exemption of the foodservice sector from 
mandatory labeling, there is a potential for diversion of lower quality imports to the non-
labeled sector. In other words, while labeling satisfies the market demand for information 
provision in one market, exemptions in the other market create incentives for the 
diversion of imports, which are assumed to be lower in quality than domestic seafood, to 
the non-labeled sector. The diversion of lower quality seafood to the non-labeled market 
segment has consequences for the welfare impact of the implementation of partial 
MCOOL. 
This paper develops a conceptual model of heterogeneous consumers that 
examines the consequences of partial MCOOL implementation on welfare and diversion. 
Numerical simulation results show that diversion is possible in the partial MCOOL 
scenario and the higher the perceived quality of domestic fish, the greater the diversion of 
low-quality imports to the non-labeled market. Real consumer surplus is greatest under 
total MCOOL implementation when quality differences between domestic and foreign 
fish are perceived to be great. However at low differences in quality, voluntary COOL is 
preferred to total MCOOL as real consumer surplus is greater under voluntary COOL. 
Profit is also greatest under voluntary COOL with both increasing quality differences and 
labeling costs.  
Our work has several policy implications. If the goal of MCOOL policy is to 
provide consumers with information through retail labeling, and if consumers value 
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quality (as previous studies have shown), then the likely unintended consequences of 
diverting food products into the non-labeled market as a result of partial COOL 
implementation need to be considered. This problem is especially important for fish and 
seafood as these products are consumed in large part in the foodservice sector—a non-
labeled market. Real consumer welfare and total welfare are greater under voluntary 
labeling than under the current partial implementation in retail only suggesting that there 
is no evident market failure argument that warrants the imposition of partial MCOOL 
law. Based on the goal of the law to provide consumers with information through retail 
labeling, and the extent to which consumers perceive the difference in quality, this law 
seems to be unnecessary. Some of our results are contingent on the fact that consumers 
value and consider domestic seafood to be of significantly higher quality than foreign 
seafood. Literature shows there are a number of studies on consumers’ willingness to pay 
for origin of food products. Our results support more work on studying consumers’ 
willingness to pay for domestic seafood. Thus, our study shows that voluntary labeling 
can mitigate asymmetric information problems arising from the credence nature of the 
origin of seafood products, and enhance consumer welfare.  
The current state of the food industry, with numerous recent safety scares and 
publicity about safe seafood choices, has contributed to the perception that foreign fish is 
of lower quality than domestic fish. The nature of the industry characterized by a 
majority of imported seafood consumed away from home poses a real question about the 
effectiveness of retail-MCOOL. Though some labeling is perhaps better than none at all, 
partial labeling can lead to undermining the effectiveness of the regulation.   
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Table 1: Welfare magnitude comparisons for fixed parameter values. 
 
Table 2: Equilibrium price and quantity comparisons for fixed parameter values. 
Parameter values: 0025.007.05.0415.1  ybcckk HLLH   
 
Sector Equilibrium 
price and 
quantity 
No 
Labeling 
Voluntary 
COOL 
Partial 
MCOOL 
Total 
MCOOL 
Retail HH qp ,  N/A 0.999, 0.170 1.103, 0.208 1.119, 0.107 
LL qp ,  N/A N/A 0.707, 0.085 0.673, 0.220 
Lqp,  0.847, 0.323 0.792, 0.197 N/A N/A 
Foodservice HH qp ,  N/A N/A N/A 1.119, 0.107 
LL qp ,  N/A N/A N/A 0.673, 0.220 
Lqp,  0.847, 0.323 0.792, 0.366 0.743, 0.405 N/A 
Note: N/A refers to not applicable 
 
Parameter values: 0025.007.05.0415.1  ybcckk HLLH   
 No 
Labeling 
Voluntary 
COOL 
Partial 
MCOOL 
Total 
MCOOL 
Expected Consumer 
Surplus 
0.130 0.150 0.156 0.113 
Real Consumer 
Surplus 
-0.005 0.104 0.076 0.113 
Producer Surplus 0.130 0.171 0.156 0.113 
Total Welfare 0.125 0.275 0.232 0.225 
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Figure 1: Market scenarios for COOL implementation 
 a. Pre-MCOOL: No Labeling 
 
 
b. Pre-MCOOL: Voluntary COOL Labeling at Retail 
 
 
 
 
c. Partial MCOOL Implementation at Retail 
 
d. Total MCOOL Implementation at Retail & Foodservice 
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Figure 2: Diversion under Partial MCOOL 
a. Pre-MCOOL: No Labeling 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b. Post-MCOOL: Partial MCOOL Implementation  
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Figure 3: Effect of increasing quality differences between domestic and foreign 
seafood on Diversion percentage under partial MCOOL ( 5.0 , 4Hc ) 
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Figure 4: Effect of increasing quality differences between domestic and foreign 
seafood on Expected consumer surplus ( 5.0 , 4Hc  ) 
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 Figure 5: Effect of increasing quality differences between domestic and foreign 
seafood on Real consumer surplus ( 5.0 , 4Hc  ) 
 
Figure 6:  Effect of increasing quality differences between domestic and foreign 
seafood on Profit ( 5.0 , 4Hc  ) 
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Figure 7a: Effect of varying labeling costs on Profits with 1.1Hk , 5.0 , and 
4Hc   
 
 
Figure 7b: Effect of varying labeling costs on Profits with 2Hk , 5.0 , and 
4Hc  
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Figure 8: Effect of increasing quality differences between domestic and foreign 
seafood on Total welfare ( 5.0 , 4Hc  ) 
 
